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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underlined the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones through the recognition of "the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories". The Islamic Republic of Iran, while welcoming the efforts for establishing such zones, firmly believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, however positive it may be, is not a substitute for the fulfilment of the legal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the Treaty and their unequivocal undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, in parallel to the efforts to establish such zones, serious efforts are needed to establish a nuclear-weapon-free world through the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

2. The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great importance to, and strongly supports, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, an idea which was presented by Iran in 1974. As a party to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol), the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), and a signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and by having in place an Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, based on which all of its nuclear facilities are under the safeguards of the Agency, Iran has a high record of accession, among the Middle Eastern countries, to the international instruments banning weapons of mass destruction. This, indeed, is a clear manifestation of the firm commitment of Iran to the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It also testifies to how strong the

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commitment of Iran is to achieving the objective of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction, in the Middle East in particular and at the global level in general.

3. Iran supported the adoption, by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of the resolution on the Middle East, which is an essential and integral element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. For the same reason, since 1995, Iran has always called for the early implementation of this resolution and the full realization of its goals and objectives. Similarly, it was also on the same grounds that Iran supported the adoption, in 2010, of a plan of action on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

4. Iran expresses its deepest concern over the persistent and long delay in the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the lack of any progress in the implementation of the respective plan of action of the 2010 Review Conference. Iran stresses that, as reaffirmed by successive Review Conferences since 1995, the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. This, without a doubt, is the individual and collective responsibility of all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, especially the three depositary States of the Treaty that co-sponsored the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. It should be recalled that the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference clearly stipulated that "the States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation".

5. The adoption of the 2010 plan of action on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which called for the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, taking the 1995 resolution as its terms of reference, although very late, was indeed the right decision in the right direction. Iran supported the adoption of that plan of action and subsequently called for its timely implementation. In addition to conducting several rounds of consultations with the facilitator of the conference, on 6 November 2012, Iran officially declared its decision to participate in that conference, which had been scheduled to be held in December 2012 in Helsinki.

6. However, not only was the 2010 plan of action on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East not implemented and, consequently, the 2012 conference not convened, but in addition, the 2015 Review Conference was unable to reach an agreement on its outcome document because of the objection of only the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Canada to a decision contained therein on the implementation of the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East. In other words, like the 2005 Review Conference, the 2015 Review Conference failed only because of the objection of certain countries to a decision on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

7. Now, 22 years after the adoption of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and seven years after the adoption of the 2010 action plan for the implementation of that resolution, and despite the strong support of the overwhelming majority of the States parties, as well as the efforts by Iran and all Arab countries in the region for their implementation, there are valid questions: why were they not implemented, and why have all the efforts under the 2005 and 2015 Review Conferences for their implementation failed? The answer is clear: Israel, which is the only non-party to the Treaty in the region and also possesses nuclear weapons and has unsafeguarded

nuclear facilities and activities, is the main and the only obstacle to the establishment of such a zone. In addition, in practice, certain parties to the Treaty, by representing the Israeli regime in the review conferences, in which Israel has no right to vote because it is not a party to the Treaty, object to decisions on the actual realization of this zone. It is also worth noting that only when those parties deem it necessary for the Review Conference to succeed, as was the case in 1995 and 2010, do they agree with its decisions on the Middle East zone, and when they do not think so, as in 2005 and 2015, they object to such decisions. Similarly, their policies and practices have proved that they agree only with taking such decisions on paper but not with their actual implementation.

8. As an example, just hours after the adoption of the 2010 action plan, which, after 15 years of delay, was the first decision on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, one of the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution and the co-conveners of the 2012 conference issued an official statement, dated 28 May 2010, in which it clearly set new conditions for the implementation of the 2010 action plan and stated:

> Despite our agreement to the final document, we have serious reservations about one aspect of the Middle East resolution it contains. The final document includes an agreement to hold a regional conference in 2012 to discuss issues relevant to a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. The United States has long supported such a zone, although **our view is that a comprehensive and durable peace in the region** and full compliance by all regional states with their arms control and non-proliferation obligations **are essential precursors for its establishment**. Just as our commitment to seek peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons will not be reached quickly, the US understands that a WMD free zone in the Middle East is a long-term goal. (emphasis added)

9. On the other hand, one day after the conclusion of the 2010 Review Conference, the Israeli regime, in its statement dated 29 May 2010, rejected outright the Final Document of that Conference as "deeply flawed" and stated that "Israel will not be able to take part in its implementation". Moreover, it took 16 months for the co-conveners of the 2012 conference to declare, on 14 October 2011, the appointment of the facilitator and the designation of the host Government for the conference. Nevertheless, even though Iran and all Arab countries had officially declared their decisions to participate in the 2012 conference, on 23 November 2012, one of the co-conveners of the conference announced that the conference could not be convened, and it "would not support a conference in which any regional State would be subject to pressure or isolation".

10. Subsequently, during the 2015 Review Conference, Israeli officials expressed concern over taking any decision by the Conference "to force Israel to come clean on its nuclear capabilities" as a step towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In order to avoid that, Israel placed the United States under pressure to block such a decision. When the United States, along with the United Kingdom and Canada, objected to the outcome document of the Conference, which contained a decision on the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 action plan on the Middle East, the Israeli Prime Minister thanked the President of the United States for such action in support of Israel.

11. But why was the Israeli regime not willing to support the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and why is it still not willing to do so? First and foremost, because this requires the prompt and unconditional accession of Israel as a non-nuclear-weapon party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, renouncing possession of its nuclear weapons and placing all of its clandestine nuclear activities

and facilities under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. This, without a doubt, is in clear contradiction of the security and military strategies of this regime that is founded on possessing highly sophisticated conventional weapons and all types of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons.

12. Moreover, a short look at the practices of the Israeli regime in the Middle East and its record in the field of disarmament and international security provides a clear picture of the seriousness of the security threat posed by this regime against the peace and security of the States parties to the Treaty in the Middle East. It also proves, once again, how essential and urgent the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction is for the maintenance of peace and security in the region and beyond. That record includes, but is not limited to, the following: since its inception, the Israeli regime has waged 17 wars, which means 1 war almost every four years; committed aggression against all of its neighbours, without exception; attacked several other non-neighbouring countries in the region and beyond; attacked the peaceful nuclear installations of two States parties to the Treaty in the Middle East (in one case of which the Security Council strongly condemned the military attack by Israel as a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct); threatened to attack the peaceful nuclear facilities of States parties to the Treaty in the region that are under IAEA safeguards; still has under occupation the territories of several neighbouring countries, as it is called, in United Nations resolutions, the "occupying Power"; is not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other international instrument banning weapons of mass destruction, in defiance of repeated calls, including by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the General Conference of IAEA, the review conferences of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the summit and ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; and is the only one in the region that is estimated to possess all types of weapons of mass destruction, including hundreds of nuclear warheads.

13. In addition, such realities make it completely clear that the only way to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is for the international community to exert and maintain sustained pressure on the Israeli regime to compel it to accede, promptly and unconditionally, as a non-nuclear-weapon party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to place all of its nuclear activities and installations under the full-scope IAEA safeguards. This approach was acknowledged by the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, which reaffirmed "the importance of Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East".

14. Iran stresses that the realization of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty requires, in addition to the full and non-discriminatory implementation of all obligations under this instrument, the prompt and full implementation of the decisions taken by the Review Conferences, in particular the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an essential and integral element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote. The 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences also reaffirmed the importance of the resolution and the full realization of its goals and objectives, and its validity until its objectives are achieved.

15. Accordingly, and given that, within the context of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, all States parties renewed their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at the prompt implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, they are urged to intensify their efforts during the 2020 Review Conference, inter alia, through adopting a concrete decision on the prompt

implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East.

16. In this context, Iran invites the 2020 Review Conference to establish a subsidiary body under its Main Committee II to consider the urgent implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East and, building upon past experiences, to agree on concrete steps for their speedy implementation.

17. Iran also proposes the following elements for inclusion in the Final Document of the 2020 Review Conference:

Reaffirming the urgent need for the prompt and full implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East;

Renewing the strong resolve of all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to undertake all necessary measures aimed at the prompt and full implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East;

Expressing deepest concern over the fact that the refusal of Israel is the main and only obstacle to the implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 plan of action on the Middle East;

Reaffirming, as it did in 2000 and 2010, the importance of the accession of Israel to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all of its nuclear activities and facilities under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East;

Deciding to establish a standing committee, comprising the members of its Bureau, to follow up on the implementation of the recommendations of the Review Conference concerning the prompt accession of Israel to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all of its nuclear activities and facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards, and to report to the 2025 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings;

Reaffirming the commitment of all States parties to the effective prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel so long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all of its nuclear activities and facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards.

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Strengthening accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Working paper submitted by Ireland on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa as members of the New Agenda Coalition

Introduction

1. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recognized the importance of accountability for the implementation by States parties of their obligations and commitments under the Treaty. To this end, the Conference "agreed that Review Conferences should look forward as well as back. They should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing, including the implementation of undertakings of the States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future. Review Conferences should also address specifically what might be done to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to achieve its universality".[1]

2. Accountability can only be pursued through the objective evaluation of the status of implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments during the course of the Treaty's review cycles. In order to be meaningful, this evaluation requires access to accurate, up-to-date, complete and comparable information. The evaluation process would further benefit from the identification of baselines and agreement on benchmarks or other criteria on the basis of which progress can be measured.

3. The call for accountability, and for the transparency needed to achieve it, is not new. For many years, the majority of States parties to the Non-Proliferation

[1] NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex, decision 1, para. 7.

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Treaty have voiced the need for progress on nuclear disarmament and for access to evidence of that progress. Notwithstanding these calls, however, information on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments remains insufficient, not least because the nuclear-weapon States continue to report in an inconsistent and patchy manner, often providing the same data year after year.

4. Given the lack of sufficient and consistent information on measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States, it has not proved possible to properly utilize the opportunity afforded by the Treaty review process to assess the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. The lack of both a baseline data set and an objective set of criteria based on which progress can be measured has further contributed to this situation. As a result, and despite concerted efforts undertaken by the New Agenda Coalition and others during review cycles, interactive and transparent engagement on the status of implementation of existing commitments has been limited. Consequently, outcome documents have, in the main, focused on agreeing upon new commitments, even though existing commitments have remained unfulfilled. However, in order to fulfil its mandate and to remain responsive to current developments, it is essential that the review process both evaluate compliance with existing obligations and develop new measures.

Status of implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments

5. At a number of previous Review Conferences, States parties agreed to take certain steps and to fulfil specific actions as part of their implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The agreements reached relating to all three pillars of the Treaty, including the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the 13 practical steps agreed upon in 2000 and the 2010 action plan, ensured the Treaty's continuing relevance. Although there has been significant progress on the nuclear non-proliferation and peaceful uses pillars of the Treaty, implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments is lagging. Moreover, the repeated commitment to pursuing and ensuring increased accountability with regard to Treaty obligations and related commitments has yet to be fully implemented. This status quo is unacceptable.

6. The New Agenda Coalition reiterates that each article of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is binding on all States parties at all times and in all circumstances. All States parties should be held fully accountable with respect to strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

7. The New Agenda Coalition recalls that all earlier commitments and undertakings remain fully applicable and that failure to comply with these during past review cycles does not absolve any State party, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, from their responsibility to take appropriate measures for their implementation as soon as possible, including effective legal measures.

8. The New Agenda Coalition further recalls the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency, which States parties to the Treaty have undertaken to apply in relation to nuclear disarmament measures.

Principle of transparency

9. Transparency is closely associated with accountability. Actions related to transparency are not only central to the credibility of any disarmament measures, but also to measuring and ascertaining compliance with the Treaty and with States parties' obligations and commitments.

10. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament. The 2010 Review Conference reaffirmed the principle of transparency, alongside irreversibility and verifiability, which would build increased confidence and trust and would contribute to sustainable disarmament.

11. The regular provision of accurate, up-to-date, complete and comparable information on the implementation of Treaty obligations is needed in order for the review process to fulfil its mandate in accordance with the 1995 decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty.[2] Furthermore, such information is necessary for the establishment of the baseline that will be used to measure progress, for example against action 5 of the 2010 action plan.

12. The nuclear-weapon States have previously committed to providing such information. Step 12 of the 13 practical steps for the implementation of article VI, adopted by the 2000 Review Conference, calls for regular reports by all States parties on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and of paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.[3] Action 20 of the action plan adopted by the 2010 Review Conference reiterates this obligation.

13. Action 21 further encourages nuclear-weapon States to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.

14. While nuclear-weapon States have provided varying levels of data regarding their national implementation of article VI, this reporting has not been standardized and is not subject to objective analysis. This state of affairs complicates the assessment and evaluation of progress.

15. In particular, the information provided does not cover the entire range of nuclear weapons and warheads and differs significantly in amount, nature and type between the nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, since the nuclear-weapon States have yet to agree on a standard reporting form, beyond what appears to be agreement on a table of contents, or on what constitutes appropriate reporting intervals as outlined in action 21 of the 2010 action plan, there is no common format for this information.

16. Lastly, no institutional mechanism exists to monitor the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations.

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[2] Ibid., decision 1.

[3] Ibid., decision 2.

Measurability of progress on nuclear disarmament

17. Reporting and measuring progress in an objective manner is essential for accountability. In that respect, the New Agenda Coalition believes that the assessment and evaluation of information would be facilitated by the identification of baselines and by the application of analytical tools. One such tool could be a set of clearly defined, mutually understood and agreed-upon criteria or benchmarks that may take the form of targets, indicators and deadlines by which progress, or the lack thereof, on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments can be measured.

18. Agreement on how to measure the implementation of existing nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments would be desirable for a number of reasons.

19. First, as was made evident during the previous review cycle and at the 2015 Review Conference, progress is difficult to claim or recognize unless it can be measured. The existence of benchmarks would facilitate the objective assessment of compliance with Treaty obligations and could also act as an incentive for their implementation.

20. Second, the determination of benchmarks would ensure more specific reporting and thus enhance transparency and accountability through measurability, in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as with evolving best practice in international treaty implementation.[4] Moreover, the inclusive discussion required in order to reach agreement on such criteria would, in itself, promote transparency in the steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear disarmament, something which has been lacking over recent years.

21. Third, discussion of and agreement on a set of benchmarks would help promote the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, raise awareness of existing nuclear disarmament obligations and the status of their implementation and enhance confidence within the Treaty community as a whole.

22. Agreeing upon a set of transparent benchmarks would not require any major new departures in the review process; the work that nuclear-weapon States, civil society, research institutes and international organizations have already undertaken on specified indicators could serve as food for thought for further discussion.

23. The New Agenda Coalition notes that not all obligations and commitments will have the same level of measurability and that this will have to be taken into account in the determination of benchmarks.

[4] The New Agenda Coalition notes that benchmarks have become a standard part of treaty implementation in the fields of the environment, trade, human rights, and disarmament and arms control. Although the mechanisms adopted by the States parties to the various treaties differ, they reflect the common understanding that international legal obligations and commitments must be implemented, and be seen to be implemented, to be credible. The idea of benchmarks is also clearly reflected in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and, in particular, in the Sustainable Development Goals.

24. Any agreed-upon benchmarks should reflect the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency and should ensure that progress in the field of nuclear disarmament is accelerated, consistent and effective.

Recommendations for the 2020 review cycle

25. The New Agenda Coalition recommends that the following actions be taken with regard to transparency, measurability and accountability:

26. Nuclear-weapon States should renew their commitment to regularly submit accurate, up-to-date, complete and comparable reports on the implementation of their Treaty obligations and commitments relating to nuclear disarmament.

27. Nuclear-weapon States should include in their reports, to be submitted throughout the 2020 review cycle, concrete and detailed information concerning the implementation of their obligations and commitments on nuclear disarmament on, inter alia:

(a) Number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed, and alert status) of nuclear warheads within their territories, as well as those deployed in the territories of other countries;

(b) Number and type of delivery vehicles;

(c) Measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

(d) Measures taken to reduce the risk of unintended, unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons;

(e) Measures taken to de-alert, or reduce the operational readiness of, nuclear weapon systems;

(f) Number and type of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts;

(g) Amount of fissile material produced for military purposes;

(h) Information about plans, expenditures and number of facilities related to the modernization of nuclear weapons.

28. Other States parties to the Treaty that maintain a role for nuclear weapons in their military and security concepts, doctrines and policies are encouraged to also provide standardized information at regular intervals on, inter alia:

(a) Measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;

(b) Number, type (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed, and alert status) of nuclear warheads within their territories, where applicable;

(c) Number and type of delivery vehicles within their territories, where applicable.

29. The New Agenda Coalition recalls the continued validity, applicability and relevance of all commitments undertaken in 1995, 2000 and 2010, and calls on

nuclear-weapon States to report on measures taken to implement those commitments at the 2018 and 2019 meetings of the Preparatory Committee and at the 2020 Review Conference.

30. The New Agenda Coalition recalls General Assembly resolution 71/54 and paragraph 18 thereof and calls upon nuclear-weapon States to implement their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, both qualitative and quantitative, in a manner that enables the States parties to regularly monitor progress, including through a standard detailed reporting format or template.

31. The Preparatory Committee should discuss options to improve the measurability of the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, in order to ensure and facilitate the objective evaluation of progress.

32. Such options may include agreement on tools such as a set of benchmarks or similar criteria, which may take the form of targets, indicators and deadlines against which progress, or the lack thereof, on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments can be measured.

33. The New Agenda Coalition recommends that discussions on how to strengthen accountability through enhanced transparency and measurability continue throughout this review cycle, with a view to reaching a concrete outcome at the 2020 Review Conference.

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Non-proliferation in all its aspects

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. Nuclear weapons, as the most horrendous, inhumane and indiscriminate weapons ever developed, are unique in their destructive power, in the unspeakable human suffering they cause, in the impossibility of controlling their effects in time and space and in the threat they pose to the environment, to future generations and, indeed, to the very survival of humanity. As agreed globally, the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination and assuring that they will never be produced again. Accordingly, nuclear disarmament has the highest priority in the field of disarmament.

2. Consequently, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as only an interim measure to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of such weapons, drives its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons can neither be regarded as an independent objective nor be reduced only to the prevention of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States. While acknowledging the importance of non-proliferation and the accomplishments made thereon, the Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that any hypothesis instilling that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has no other objective than non-proliferation is in clear contradiction with both the object and purpose and the letter and spirit of the Treaty, in particular its article VI, which is focused on nuclear disarmament.

3. The Islamic Republic of Iran shares the view that nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are mutually reinforcing. However, they can be regarded as mutually reinforcing only if the non-proliferation efforts are accompanied by parallel practical steps on nuclear disarmament; if the effects of nuclear disarmament measures are not neutralized through proliferation efforts in the form of nuclear-weapon-sharing by the nuclear-weapon States; if the nuclear disarmament achievements are not defused by the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States; and if the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not pursued at the price of a lack of any tangible progress on nuclear disarmament.

4. Therefore, reviewing the progress in the implementation of the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty should be carried out, first and foremost,

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through assessing actual progress in nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the following elements should be taken into account: the establishment and promotion of the effectiveness of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and the nuclear-weapon-free status of concerned countries; advancing the universality of the Treaty; developing a universally effective, unconditional, legally binding instrument to assure the safety of non-nuclear-weapon States parties against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances; and preventing: the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons; research on, and the development of, nuclear weapons; upgrading and refurbishing of existing nuclear weapons; the development new types of such weapons; the construction of new facilities for the production of nuclear-weapons; nuclear-weapon-sharing with other countries; the continuation of nuclear umbrella arrangements; and assisting other States, directly or indirectly, to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

5. In view of the aforementioned observations, the Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great importance to the full implementation of the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty, as well as the relevant parts of the final documents of its Review Conferences.

6. In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the best way to ensure the actual realization of the non-proliferation objective of the Treaty is indeed the full compliance of all States parties with all of their obligations thereunder. In this regard, full compliance of all the nuclear-weapon-States with their obligations, in particular under articles I and VI of the Treaty, is of outmost importance, as it can ensure progress on nuclear disarmament and the prevention of measures such as the modernization of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear-weapon-sharing and nuclear umbrella arrangements. In this connection, the importance of the full compliance of non-nuclear-weapon States parties engaged in nuclear-weapon-sharing and nuclear umbrella arrangements with their respective obligations under article II of the Treaty should also be underlined.

7. Moreover, another important and complementary option to ensure the full realization of the non-proliferation objective of the Treaty is its universalization. The failure of the Treaty in gaining this universal characteristic remains a serious challenge undermining its effectiveness and credibility, which needs to be addressed. As "zero" is called "the only safe number of nuclear weapons on the planet", undoubtedly, "zero is the only acceptable number of countries outside the Treaty". It is mainly due to the importance of this factor that the 2010 Review Conference called upon "all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty".

8. It is obvious, in particular, that the universality of the Treaty is of utmost importance in a region such as the Middle East, where the nuclear weapons of the Israeli regime continue to threaten the region and beyond. It was based on such an assumption that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed "the importance of Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive [International Atomic Energy Agency] IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East", as also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference.

9. However, contrary to the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, and in violation of the obligation of States parties under article III (2) of the Treaty, nuclear cooperation between a certain nuclear-weapon State and the Israeli regime has continued unabated. Moreover, the decision of the so-called Nuclear Supplier Group, consisting of a limited number of States parties to the Treaty, in authorizing

nuclear cooperation between its members and a non-party to the Treaty constitutes a clear breach of the obligations under articles I and III of the Treaty and the commitment made under paragraph 12 of decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament) and paragraph 36 of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the States parties agreed that any new supply arrangements for the transfer of nuclear material or equipment should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full-scope of IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such acts have adverse effects on prospects for achieving the universality of the Treaty by sending a wrong message, that being a non-party to the Treaty is more privileged than being a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty.

10. At the same time, both nuclear-weapon-sharing between the nuclear-weapon States themselves and between them and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty — the living example of which is the nuclear-weapon-sharing within a certain military alliance — are clear violations of the explicit obligations of concerned States parties under articles I and II of the Treaty. This trend is indeed a setback to the realization of the non-proliferation objective of the Treaty and seriously undermines its effectiveness and erodes its credibility. Regrettably, such unjustifiable practices are undertaken by those parties to the Treaty which pretend to be the strongest advocates of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference should address this violation and make practical decisions to rectify it.

11. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free status by a certain country, which led to the absence of nuclear weapons in the respective territory of that State and those parties to the treaties establishing such zones, are indeed other achievements in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They indeed contribute to the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, but are certainly not a substitute either for other non-proliferation measures or for the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide. At the same time, they are insufficient and incomplete unless and until the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free world is realized. Other challenges of such zones is the abstention of certain nuclear-weapon States from granting full, effective, non-discriminatory, unconditional and irrevocable legally binding security assurances to all the parties to treaties establishing these zones against the threat or use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. Likewise, the absence of political will by certain non-parties to the Treaty in support of the establishment of such zones in other parts of the world is another challenge in this regard; the living example of this is the refusal of the Israeli regime to participate in the implementation of the 1995 resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2010 action plan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

12. Moreover, one of the factors negatively affecting the full realization of the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty is the lack of sufficient security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons continues to pose a serious security threat to the very survival of humankind. As long as such weapons exist, the risk of their possible use or threat of use persists. Thus, pending their total elimination, as the only absolute guarantee against their threat or use, there is a need, as an interim measure only, to grant to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances. This is important, as the current assurances are very limited, conditional, and insufficient and, above all, can justify the use of such weapons by resorting to such concepts as "defending

the vital interests" of a nuclear-weapon State or its "allies and partners". As the lack of progress in this field would deepen the already existing frustration of non-nuclear-weapon States about the current states of affairs with regard to the implementation of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty, it needs to be considered by the Review Conference.

13. Likewise, the ongoing measures and plans of all nuclear-weapon States to modernize or upgrade their nuclear weapon arsenals, and of certain nuclear-weapon States to develop new types of such weapons, including new types of non-strategic nuclear weapons — that, by reducing the threshold for their use, increase the possibility and risk of their use — are other sources of grave concern with regard to nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This trend, which continues to adversely affect the effectiveness of the Treaty and to undermine its object and purpose, needs to be effectively addressed by the Review Conference.

14. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that the only non-proliferation measures that can be considered effective and in line with the realization of the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are those that are carried out in parallel with each other, and that, in practice, prevent completely the spread of nuclear weapons to geographical areas beyond the territories of the nuclear-weapon States, halt the assistance, directly or indirectly, to other countries, party or non-party to the Treaty, in manufacturing or otherwise acquiring or taking control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and prevent the development of any new types of nuclear weapons or the upgrading of existing nuclear weapons — as it would be paradoxical to prevent the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons and to reduce their number while preserving the same or a higher destructive power. This is because what essentially matters in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not only preventing their spread or reducing their number, it is limiting their geographical scope, number and destructive power, and the possibility of their threat or use. Therefore, to be effective, non-proliferation measures, in addition to limiting the geographical scope of nuclear weapons, should also reduce the number and destructive power of such weapons and the possibility of their threat or use. At the same time, since the ultimate objective of all nuclear non-proliferation measures is nuclear disarmament, such measures should result in advancing the overall objective of nuclear disarmament.

15. One of the alarming trends in the implementation of the Treaty and in its Review Conferences is the attempt, by certain States parties, using non-proliferation as a pretext, aimed at restricting, directly or indirectly, the exercise of the inalienable right of States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. As the Treaty itself clearly states "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination", and all such measures should be considered as clear violations of the object and purpose and the letter and spirit of the Treaty. Equally, the persistence of this trend would continue to hamper "the economic or technological development of the Parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes", which, according to the Treaty shall be avoided by all the parties. The Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that no genuine non-proliferation measure can, or should, limit or suspend, partly or in full, any element of the inalienable right of all the parties under article IV of the Treaty, let alone use non-proliferation as a pretext to violate that right. Due to its importance, this issue needs to be effectively addressed by the Review Conference.

16. Expressing deep concern over the failure of the 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty, which could also negatively impact the full realization of the non-proliferation provisions of the Treaty, the Islamic Republic of Iran is of the view that the 2020 Review Conference should review the progress made in the implementation of the Treaty provisions regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as related parts of the final documents of its Review Conferences, and take appropriate decisions thereon. To that end, the Islamic Republic of Iran proposes the following elements for incorporation into the final document of the 2020 Review Conference:

> "*Reaffirming* that the full and effective implementation of the obligations under the Treaty on not transferring to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, is essential for achieving the objective of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the universality of the Treaty;
>
> "*Confirming* the continued validity of all decisions on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons agreed to at the Review Conferences of the Treaty until all their objectives are achieved;
>
> "*Confirming also* the commitment of concerned nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to the nuclear-weapon-sharing and nuclear umbrella arrangements;
>
> "*Confirming further* the commitment of all nuclear-weapon States to cease completely, and no later than 2025, all plans aimed at upgrading and refurbishing their existing nuclear weapon systems, developing new types of nuclear weapon systems and constructing any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons at home and abroad;
>
> "*Underlining* that States parties to the Treaty, in conformity with its provisions, shall avoid using non-proliferation as a means to impose restrictions or limitations on the peaceful nuclear activities of other States parties, including the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Working paper submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic

I. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Syrian Arab Republic was one of the first States in the region of the Middle East to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968 and firmly believes that the possession of nuclear weapons by any State or acquisition of those weapons by non-State actors or terrorist groups threatens international peace and security. Syria has affirmed, in all international forums, its continuing commitment to its international undertakings under the Treaty, which it considers the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and an international reference that accords the States parties the inalienable right to acquire nuclear technology for use in various peaceful applications.

2. The Syrian Arab Republic recalls that the resolution to extend the Treaty indefinitely, which was adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, would not have been possible had it not been for the understanding reached at that time whereby the nuclear-weapon States committed to a review of the concerns of many States parties in the Middle East region, particularly the need to pressure the Israeli entity to accede to the Treaty, unconditionally place all its installations under comprehensive safeguards without further delay and eliminate all its military nuclear capabilities, which are not subject to international supervision, in order to pave the way for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, that has not happened to date.

3. The Syrian Arab Republic expresses its deep concern over the failure to achieve the Treaty's objectives. It hopes that the final document of the 2020 First Preparatory Committee of the States parties to the Treaty will include serious and effective demands in respect of:

(a) Achieving the universality and maintaining the credibility of the Treaty;

(b) Treating the issues relating to non-proliferation and comprehensive nuclear disarmament in a balanced manner;

(c) Protecting the inalienable right of all Treaty parties to the use of nuclear energy for various peaceful applications, without discrimination;

(d) Pressuring Israel to accede unconditionally to the Treaty as a non-nuclear party and to submit all its nuclear facilities to international inspection in accordance

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with the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

4. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses the obligation of nuclear-weapon States under article I of the Treaty to undertake not to transfer to Israel any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or any direct or indirect control of weapons or such devices, and not to assist, encourage or spur Israel in any way whatsoever to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to acquire control thereof in any other manner.

II. Nuclear disarmament

5. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that the nuclear-weapon States must comply with article VI of the Treaty and the 13 points set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The Syrian Arab Republic expresses its concern at the nuclear-weapon States' continued development and proliferation of nuclear warheads, which is contrary to the Treaty and United Nations General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament, the most recent of which is General Assembly resolution 70/38 of 7 December 2015, entitled "Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

6. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms the importance of working earnestly towards the conclusion of a comprehensive, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiable treaty to eliminate the stock of nuclear weapons and fissile material and to ban the production of any fissile material used in the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as doing so is a primary step towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

7. The Syrian Arab Republic calls on all States to declare and adhere to a voluntary halt to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons pursuant to General Assembly resolution 70/40 of 7 December 2015, entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons".

8. The Syrian Arab Republic, seeking to uphold the credibility and spirit of the Treaty, emphasizes the need for the 2020 Review Conference and its preparatory committees to consider the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States as expressed in their national reports.

III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

9. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that article IV of the Treaty, which accords all States parties the inalienable right to obtain nuclear technology for various peaceful applications, must be enforced in a balanced, non-selective manner. The Syrian Arab Republic supports the inclusion of this right in the Final Document of the current preparatory session, in order to preclude any new interpretations that may conflict with the spirit of the Treaty and undermine its credibility.

10. The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms the need to uphold the primary role of IAEA as provided in its Statute, which is to promote the use of nuclear technology, to facilitate the interchange of information, equipment, materials and scientific services, to encourage and assist the States parties in conducting scientific research for peaceful purposes and to provide them with technical assistance.

11. The Syrian Arab Republic stresses that political, economic or military restrictions should not be imposed, nor should any other conditions be imposed that

conflict with the Statute of IAEA on the cooperation and technical assistance provided by IAEA to States parties, particularly developing States.

12. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms the need to strike a balance between IAEA verification activities and its dissemination of nuclear technology and applications, in order to uphold the provisions of article III of the Treaty. That article stresses that verification under IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements is an indispensable element of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

13. The Syrian Arab Republic supports IAEA and its mandate to carry out its assigned functions within the three main areas of the Treaty, namely, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

IV. Comprehensive safeguards agreement

14. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that it complies fully with the provisions of the comprehensive safeguards agreement that it concluded with IAEA in 1992 pursuant to the Treaty. Under that agreement, Syria established a national system to account for and monitor nuclear material, and created the groundwork and facilities necessary to ensure that IAEA inspectors could carry out their work effectively under the agreement from the time of its signing to date.

15. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms the importance of the comprehensive safeguards agreements. It urges all States that have not yet concluded such an agreement to do so promptly in order to universalize the comprehensive safeguards, which the 2000 Treaty Review Conference set forth as a primary objective in order to consolidate and strengthen verification activities within the non-proliferation regime.

16. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that IAEA alone is authorized to verify and ensure that States parties comply with the safeguards agreements that have concluded with the Agency. When evaluating the outcome of verification processes, IAEA must rely on documented and corroborated information instead of information obtained from open sources or on assumptions, intelligence information and the like, in order to maintain the neutrality, credibility and professionalism of IAEA.

17. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that IAEA must safeguard the confidentiality of all information collected during its inspections of a State or received from a State.

18. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms the need to maintain the distinction between the legal obligations of States parties and voluntary, confidence-building measures, as provided in the Final Document of the last Treaty Review Conference held in May 2010 in New York. That document states that accession to an additional protocol is voluntary. Thus, all States should take care to avoid confusing voluntary and mandatory measures, in order to ensure the credibility of international resolutions and preclude the conversion of voluntary commitments into commitments involving legal safeguards.

V. Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone

19. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone is an important disarmament measure that would strengthen the non-proliferation regime, help consolidate peace and security at the regional and international levels and preserve the credibility of the Treaty.

20. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is a positive step and an effective contribution to the achievement of the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament as a prelude to creating a safe, stable world. The Syrian Arab Republic looks to the international community to adopt practical, effective steps to establish a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.

21. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that Israel's failure to accede to the Treaty, its refusal to subject all its nuclear facilities to international inspection by IAEA and its disregard of all relevant international resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, the most recent of which are General Assembly resolution 70/24 of 7 December 2015, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", and General Assembly resolution 70/70 of 7 December 2015, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East", as well as its disregard of resolutions adopted by IAEA and the Treaty Review Conferences, has made it impossible to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

22. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone should in no way be linked to the peace process in the region. It reiterates that any definition of the States of the Middle East developed for this purpose does not in any way constitute a definition of the Middle East region. Rather, such a definition should be used only for the purposes of the 2020 Treaty Review Conference and its preparatory committees.

VI. 2012 international conference on implementing the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty

23. The Syrian Arab Republic again calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. That resolution, which is an integral part of a package that includes one decision and three resolutions adopted without a vote, extended the Treaty indefinitely in 1995. The Final Document of the 2000 Treaty Review Conference, which states that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East will remain valid until its goals and objectives are achieved, should thus be honoured.

24. The Syrian Arab Republic regrets the failure to convene the 2012 international conference called for in the Final Document of the 2010 Treaty Review Conference. That conference was to have been attended by all States of the Middle East and was to have addressed the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

25. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the success of the 2020 Treaty Review Conference will depend primarily on the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Treaty Review and Extension Conference. It will also depend on the commitment of all concerned parties to establish a zone in the Middle East that is free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction.

VII. Negative security assurances

26. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that only the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons can provide an absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and that the indefinite extension adopted in 1995 does not in any way imply that nuclear-weapon States will retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely, as that would be inconsistent with the integrity and sustainability of the

nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally, and contrary to the objective of maintaining regional and international security and stability.

27. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that the final document of the 2020 Treaty Review Conference must include effective international arrangements for arriving at a legally binding international instrument on security assurances. Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 70/25 of 7 December 2015, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", the nuclear-weapon States would commit to providing unconditional security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use nuclear weapons.

28. The Syrian Arab Republic again calls for the establishment of a working group to monitor the legally binding negative security assurances of the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty as a prelude to arriving at an international instrument banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 70/62 of 7 December 2015, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons".

VIII. Illegal trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials

29. The Syrian Arab Republic, pursuant to its national legislation and regulations, closely monitors land, sea and air border crossings to combat illegal trafficking in radioactive nuclear materials.

30. The Syrian Arab Republic scrupulously upholds all of its relevant international commitments. It participates effectively in the review of a number of relevant international conventions and instruments and seeks to strengthen its national legislative frameworks in that regard. The Syrian Arab Republic applies the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and actively participates in a number of meetings that develop guidelines for the importation and exportation of radioactive materials.

IX. Withdrawal from the Treaty

31. The Syrian Arab Republic believes that withdrawal from the Treaty undermines its universality and that any proposal to amend article X would damage the Treaty's credibility and destroy the entire non-proliferation regime, unless all States parties explicitly declared their intent to comply by law with the new amendments and to ratify them. Otherwise, any amendments would have no basis in international law.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Disarmament and non-proliferation education and awareness-raising

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)

1. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for the first time in the history of the Treaty, underscored the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. Indeed, in action 22 of the action plan adopted at the Conference, all States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124).

2. As expressed in our ministerial statement released in April 2014, the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative are committed to actively promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education in order to create further momentum for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

3. According to the report of the Secretary-General, the overall objective of disarmament and non-proliferation education is to impart knowledge and skills to individuals to empower them to make their contributions, as national and world citizens, to the achievement of concrete disarmament and non-proliferation measures. Disarmament and non-proliferation education should thus not be intended to indoctrinate in terms of specific ways of thinking, but rather to nurture critical thinking. In this way, people will be empowered to obtain a thorough grasp of the international situation, make sound judgments and take appropriate actions.

4. Besides placing importance on critical thinking in disarmament and non-proliferation education, members of the Initiative also encourage all efforts to promote awareness-raising, a catalyst which leads individuals to an aspiration to pursue a world free of nuclear weapons. Such efforts shall include visits by leaders, young people and others to, and interactions with, communities and people, including those affected by the use of nuclear weapons, who pass on their experiences to future generations, to ensure that their memories do not fade away.

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We will actively promote this issue in the 2020 Treaty review process and are committed implementing the above-mentioned recommendations and efforts.

5. The members of the Initiative note the various documents that address the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education and awareness-raising, including the draft final document of the 2015 Review Conference and the final report of the Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations in 2016 (A/71/371).

6. Profound understanding and awareness of the realities of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons fundamentally underpin all work in pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons. There are various approaches to and positions on how to proceed with nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, it is beyond controversy that the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons is a desire shared by all mankind. Members of the Initiative are committed to taking forward every effort, through education and awareness-raising, to foster and convey to the next generation the will to pursue this lofty ideal.

7. In implementing action 22 of the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, States parties are invited to take into account the following four points:

(a) Because achieving a world free of nuclear weapons requires long-term and continuous efforts, educating young people, especially teenagers, is most crucial. Such efforts are encouraged to be made with a focus on ways to cultivate critical thinking, such as role-playing and simulated negotiations;

(b) The amassed knowledge and experience of the realities of atomic bombings should also be passed on to younger generations, so that they can actively engage in disarmament and non-proliferation issues;

(c) Disarmament and non-proliferation education and awareness-raising should be undertaken in a collaborative way. Various actors, such as governments both national and local, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the media, academics and the private sector, should cooperate closely with and learn from one another through interaction. Governments can serve as the hub of a network of actors and a provider of resources to facilitate interaction;

(d) In the 2002 report on disarmament and non-proliferation education, it was recommended that new information and communications technologies be used, in particular the Internet, as well as a full range of pedagogical methods, including literature, theatre and other artistic activities.

Annex

Disarmament and non-proliferation education and awareness-raising

The following are examples of the achievements and programmes pursued by the international community, including members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, as of May 2017:

1. In 1978, the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme was launched by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament. The Programme is aimed at the training and specialization of national officials in more Member States, in particular the developing countries, and enabling them to participate more effectively in international deliberating and negotiating forums. As of 2017, through the Programme, more than 900 public officials from more than 160 Member States, many of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament within their own Governments, have been trained.

2. Since 2003, Canada has partnered with the Simons Foundation to award the Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Since its inception, the programme has provided more than Can $280,000 in scholarships to Canadian graduate students working on issues of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament and has helped to encourage a new generation of young Canadian scholars dedicated to further expanding their knowledge of and expertise in these critical issues.

3. In 2010, Japan launched the programme "Special Communicator for a World without Nuclear Weapons", through which the hibakusha were designated special communicators to support the transmission of their first-hand experiences of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons to the international community and future generations. As of May 2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a total of 261 commissions for the programme for 83 separate events. As part of this effort, since 2011, Japan has had the stories of the hibakusha translated into 13 languages, including Chinese, English, French, Korean, Russian and Spanish, in cooperation with the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the embassies in Tokyo, making them available on the website of the Ministry, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/testimony_of_hibakusha.

4. In 2013, Japan launched the programme "Youth Communicator for a World without Nuclear Weapons" with the aim of passing on the realities of atomic bombings to future generations at a time when the hibakusha are ageing. In 2016, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Fumio Kishida, expressed his strong desire to share this sense of mission with young people around the world, launching the programme worldwide. As of May 2017, 225 young people have served as youth communicators.

5. From 4 to 8 July 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, along with the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Matías Romero Institute of the Mexican Diplomatic Academy, conducted its third annual summer school on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, aimed at Latin American and Caribbean diplomats. The purpose of the programme was to generate a space for analysis and thoughtful discussion concerning the relevance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through broad and thorough capacity-building in the notions, technologies and basic policies relating to nuclear weapons, the multilateral processes that lead to treaties on these weapons and new developments and perspectives. Participants included representatives of 25 regional countries, who

were able to interact with international experts in the field of nuclear disarmament from civil society, government and the academic sector.

6. On 3 October 2016, on the margins of the First Committee of the General Assembly, Poland, with the participation of other countries and the Office for Disarmament Affairs, organized the side event "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education — what's next?". The purpose of the event was to bring together the co-authors of the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education and other stakeholders to look back at what had been achieved since 2002 and take a fresh look at the future of disarmament and non-proliferation education in the digital age.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Transparency by all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Joint working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates)

1. As recognized in the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as in the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference, increased transparency is essential to further progress in nuclear disarmament.

2. With regard to the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, action 5 states that:

> The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia...further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

3. Action 20 states that:

> States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament', and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

4. In addition, action 21 notes that:

> As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to

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determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.

5. As a part of its efforts to promote the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted working papers on the subject of transparency to the 2012 and 2014 Preparatory Committee meetings and to the 2015 Review Conference.

6. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative's working paper of 2012 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12) included a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form with specific items on which the Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon States could provide information, including: the quantity, types and status of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems; the quantity of fissile material produced for military purposes in the past, as well as in the present; and the measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. The aim of this proposal was to provide the nuclear-weapon States with a template to use in implementing actions 5 and 21.

7. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative's working paper of 2014 (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.10) made a number of recommendations to the 2015 Review Conference, including the reiteration of the three principles of disarmament-transparency, verification and irreversibility; calling on the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments under actions 5 and 21 by agreeing on a standard reporting form; calling on the nuclear-weapon States to submit annual reports using an agreed standard reporting form; and calling on all non-nuclear-weapon States to also submit regular reports on the fulfilment of their Treaty commitments and obligations.

8. Following up on the latter recommendation in its joint working paper of 2014, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted to the 2015 Review Conference a reporting template for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty with its working paper on transparency (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.17). This reporting template aimed to provide a concise and user-friendly model which non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty could use to fulfil their action 20 commitment to report on their implementation of the action plan of 2010. The reporting template includes a number of suggested elements under each action plan item, if applicable.

9. Building upon its previous working papers, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submits with the present working paper a new reporting template that can be used by all States parties to provide information about how they have implemented their Treaty commitments, particularly the action plan of 2010 (see annex).

10. We encourage all States parties to make use of this reporting template throughout the 2020 Treaty review cycle, with a view to increasing the quality, quantity and consistency of transparency by all States parties. We also encourage the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to establish a publicly accessible repository for annual reports.

11. We also remind the nuclear-weapon States of their commitments contained in the action plan of 2010, and further encourage the regular submission of transparency reports by these States during the 2020 review cycle.

Annex

Report by [country] on the implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls on States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the plan, as well as of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Action 21 of the action plan states that, as a confidence-building measure, all nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. [country] submits this report in accordance with these commitments.

Action number	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*
Nuclear disarmament	
1	Summary of national policy on nuclear disarmament, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy.
	Membership in regional/multilateral groups that promote nuclear disarmament.
2	National policy on irreversibility, verifiability and transparency, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy.
	Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions that support irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.
3	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
	Summary of unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures to reduce national stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
4	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
	Current information on aggregate numbers of deployed nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles in accordance with the most recent reporting through the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
	Summary of recent inspections of facilities through New START.
	Summary of any meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission established by New START.
	Summary of bilateral meetings to discuss future nuclear reduction agreements.
5 (a)	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
	Information on the overall reductions in the national stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons during the five review cycles since the Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended: 1995-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010, 2010-2015 and 2015-present.

Action number	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*
5 (b)	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Information on the current stockpile of all types of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, including deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic, and those awaiting dismantlement, as well as their locations. Information should be provided in the following categories for both nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles: (i) total number, including those awaiting dismantlement; and (ii) number in stockpile (deployed strategic and non-strategic, non-deployed strategic and non-strategic), excluding those awaiting dismantlement. In addition, for delivery vehicles of nuclear warheads: number of delivery vehicles by type (missiles, aircraft, submarines, artillery, others) for item (ii) above. Information on current stockpiles of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Information should be provided in the following categories: (i) aggregate amount of plutonium produced for national security purposes/nuclear weapons purposes (in metric tons); (ii) aggregate amount of highly enriched uranium produced for national security purposes/nuclear weapons purposes (in metric tons); and (iii) amount of fissile material declared excess for national security purposes/nuclear weapons (in metric tons). *Note*: Nuclear weapons purposes are a subcategory of national security purposes, which includes military purposes other than nuclear weapons, such as for naval fuel.
5 (c)	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Measures taken, or in the process of being taken, to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. Information on the scope and focus of policy reviews, either scheduled, under way or completed, relating to nuclear weapon stockpiles, nuclear doctrine or nuclear posture.
5 (d)	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Summary of discussions on policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons.
5 (e)	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Measures taken, or in the process of being taken, to reduce the operational readiness of the reporting State's nuclear arsenal. Summary of efforts to engage non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons.
5 (f)	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Measures taken, or in the process of being taken, to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons.

Action number	*Examples of information to include, as applicable*
5 (g)	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Summary of any unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral confidence- and security-building measures to enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence, as well as those measures put in place with regard to nuclear weapons.
6	Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or General Assembly resolutions. Participation in any working groups on nuclear disarmament.
7	Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to discuss effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or General Assembly resolutions.
8	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Description of unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral security assurances provided to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
9	(For all States) National efforts to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions and/or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers that support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Name of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to which your country is party. (For nuclear-weapon States) Summary of efforts (including current status and future prospects) to ratify the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties or to review any related reservations on the ratification of such protocols. Current status of consultations and cooperation on entry into force of the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones.
10	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Current status of signature and ratification (including dates of signature and ratification) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and summary of efforts to complete the ratification of that Treaty (if applicable). Summary of efforts to encourage Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
11	Date of signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Current status of the reporting State's policy on the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions.

Action number	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*
12	Confirmation that commitment was met to report at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference) held in 2011 on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty. Summary of reports made at the subsequent Article XIV Conferences on progress made towards the entry into force of that Treaty.
13	Activities to promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and global levels, in particular a summary of efforts to encourage all States that have yet to do so to sign and ratify the Treaty (e.g., positions on General Assembly resolutions; participation in Article XIV Conferences or Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ministerial meetings; participation in Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or national, regional, multilateral activities). Summary of national efforts to fully implement the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (e.g., national legislation or policies). List any nationals who participate in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Group of Eminent Persons.
14	Summary of national efforts to construct, complete and/or certify International Monitoring System stations. Summary of national efforts to help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization strengthen its verification regime (e.g., workshops, seminars, training, exercises, voluntary funding contributions and/or in-kind contributions). Summary of national efforts to help develop the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization's on-site inspection capabilities.
15	Support for launching negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference on Disarmament, General Assembly resolutions and/or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers. Summary of contributions to the Group of Governmental Experts on the subject. Summary of contributions to the High-level Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty Expert Preparatory Group.
16	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Information on any current status and future plans, such as amount and time frame to: (i) declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) any fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes; (ii) place such material under IAEA or other relevant international verification; and/or (iii) arrange for the disposition of such material.
17	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Information on the status of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile material.

Action number	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*
	Proposals and/or statements made in support of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile material from military stockpiles by nuclear-weapon States.
18	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) Information on any current or future plans to dismantle, or convert to peaceful uses, facilities that produce fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes. Confirmation that domestic nuclear facilities do not produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
19	Any cooperation among governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament. Summary of national, regional and international efforts to promote greater transparency, confidence and efficiency in the verification of nuclear disarmament.
20	Year and official document symbol of all regular reports on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.
21	(For nuclear-weapon States) Any agreed standard reporting form and determined reporting intervals. Summary of efforts to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. (For non-nuclear-weapon States) Summary of efforts to encourage the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine an appropriate reporting interval.
22	Summary of efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education (e.g., contributions to the report of the Secretary-General, adding the subject to school curriculums, seminars, conferences, exhibitions, partnerships with civil society, public events, social media events, contests).
Nuclear non-proliferation	
23	Summary of efforts to promote universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
24	Summary of safeguards agreements concluded with IAEA, such as a comprehensive safeguards agreement, Additional Protocol and/or Modified Small Quantities Protocol.
25	Summary of efforts to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement, or to facilitate and encourage others to do so.
26	Summary of national efforts to comply with non-proliferation obligations. Examples of initiatives, including through Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers, that promote high international standards of compliance.

Action number	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*
	Summary of IAEA conclusions about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
27	Summary of national steps taken to address cases of non-compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty non-proliferation obligations, including the implementation of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council or statements in relevant international forums, such as the IAEA General Conference or Board of Governors.
28	Date of signature and entry into force of an Additional Protocol agreement with IAEA.
	Summary of efforts to implement the Additional Protocol or to encourage and facilitate others to do so.
29	Summary of national, regional and/or multilateral efforts to promote or assist other States in concluding or implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement
30	Summary of support for efforts to apply safeguards more widely in nuclear-weapon States (e.g., Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers)
31	Efforts to amend or rescind an existing Small Quantities Protocol.
32	Summary of efforts to review and evaluate IAEA safeguards, including efforts to support decisions to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards.
33	Summary of status of payment of assessed contributions to IAEA.
	Summary of extrabudgetary, voluntary and/or in-kind contributions to IAEA.
34	Summary of contributions to the development of an international technology base to help improve IAEA safeguards.
35	Summary of efforts in export control regimes (e.g., the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement), Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and its reporting mechanism and other arrangements (e.g., domestic legislation or bilateral agreements) that help to ensure nuclear-related exports do not lead to proliferation.
36	Summary of the implementation of nuclear export control lists in domestic export control legislation and/or regulations.
37	Summary of efforts to show that the safeguards and compliance record of a recipient State is taken into account in making nuclear export decisions.
38	Support for the legitimate right of States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as by providing a list of States with which nuclear cooperation agreements have been completed.
39	Summary of key policy criteria considered when determining whether or not to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State.
40	Summary of efforts to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear facilities, particularly by the national regulatory agency
	Summary of efforts undertaken to implement commitments made in the Nuclear Security Summit process.

Action number	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*
41	Summary of efforts to apply the IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected).
	Timeline for any planned national reviews of physical protection policies and practices or any reviews that have been accomplished.
42	Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment.
	Summary of efforts to promote the ratification and implementation of the Convention and its 2005 Amendment
43	Summary of steps taken to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.
	Summary of steps taken to implement the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.
44	Summary of efforts to strengthen national capabilities against the illicit trafficking of nuclear material.
	Summary of efforts to provide assistance to other States to strengthen national capabilities against the illicit trafficking of nuclear material (e.g., commitments made in the context of the Nuclear Security Summit process, the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction).
	Information about participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
	Information about participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
	Summary of any reports provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).
	Status of participation in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database.
	Status of participation in the nuclear security activities of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).
45	Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
46	Summary of activities to strengthen national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including establishing and maintaining a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, as well as any regional-level systems.
	Summary of cooperation with IAEA on accounting and control of nuclear materials.
	Summary of support for IAEA programmes relevant to these actions, including the nuclear security relevant work of the IAEA nuclear safety and security programme.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy	
47	Summary of the types of peaceful uses of nuclear energy being pursued nationally (e.g., power generation, mining, medical, agricultural).
48	Summary of national policy on nuclear cooperation, including legislation on export controls.

Action number	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*
49	Summary of national, bilateral, regional and/or multilateral efforts to further the development and application of nuclear technologies to areas that will help to meet the needs of developing countries.
50	Summary of international efforts to assist developing countries, identifying those activities which are undertaken through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.
51	List of the total number of countries with which nuclear cooperation agreements are in effect (see actions 37 and 38). List of the total number of nuclear cooperation agreements awaiting implementation.
52	Summary of efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, such as by advocating for accountability and transparency in the operation of the Programme, supporting the implementation of recommendations made by the Agency's Office of Internal Oversight Services, etc.
53	Summary of efforts in the IAEA Board of Governor's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee. Summary of efforts to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including through any voluntary financial or in-kind contributions.
54	Rate of attainment on assessed voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund.
55	Summary of any voluntary contributions to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative or other extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA.
56	Summary of national, bilateral and international efforts with regard to capacity-building and human resource development on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
57	Title and date of key national legislation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
58	Summary of efforts to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
59	Status vis-à-vis the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Status vis-à-vis the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment could be reiterated (see actions 42 and 45).
60	Summarize how international best practices on nuclear safety and security have been implemented nationally. Summarize any contributions to the IAEA Safety Standards Series, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and review meetings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Summarize any participation in or contributions to workshops to share best practices, including with the nuclear industry, private sector and non-governmental organizations such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security.

Action number	*Examples of information to include (if applicable)*
61	Summarize any national efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes and/or convert nuclear facilities to low-enriched uranium. Summarize any international assistance provided to other States to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes.
62	Summarize national regulations on the transport of radioactive materials, noting in particular the implementation of the IAEA updated standards on transport regulations (No. SSR-6, 2012).
63	List the date of signature and ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and/or the Paris Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. List the title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability.
64	Summarize national position and efforts taken to prohibit [*and prevent*] armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes during their operation or while under construction.

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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Nuclear testing

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the only way to rid the world of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and should prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development and also refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as from the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and to refrain from any other action

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that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.

4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

5. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 166 States. In this context, the ratifications of Angola, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Myanmar, Niue and Swaziland are welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, would be essential.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and by those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through the accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

8. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty's verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear

devices and of nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear test for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

12. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas. In this regard, the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations trust territories who have been adversely affected as a result of nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.

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Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Working paper submitted by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be an important step towards strengthening nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes. The Group is, therefore, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group underlines the importance of the early fulfilment of the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean), Rarotonga (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty), Bangkok (Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone), Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty) and Semipalatinsk (Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia) and considers them as positive steps and important measures towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group welcomes the efforts aimed at establishing other nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide and calls for cooperation and broad consultation among the States of the regions concerned to conclude agreements establishing such zones.

3. In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and calls for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995. The resolution remains valid until its objectives are achieved.

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Furthermore, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its disappointment that, as a result of the opposition by Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America at the concluding session of the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consensus on measures regarding the process to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was not achieved.

4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reiterates that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons and in order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it is the legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group reaffirms that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is also essential that all the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and concrete legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear-weapon States of the zone that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations to achieve the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.

5. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, emphasizes the need to strengthen the integrity of the statute of denuclearization provided for in that Treaty by reviewing the declarations that were formulated by the nuclear-weapon States parties to Additional Protocols I and II thereto, for possible withdrawal or modification.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty urges States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (see A/S-10/4) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. In this context, the Group considers that the further institutionalization of the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia would be an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, recalling the convening of the third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, held in New York on 24 April 2015, calls upon the States parties and signatories to those treaties to put in place further forms of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States.

8. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Semipalatinsk and Bangkok in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in the territories of the States parties to those treaties, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

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The inalienable right to develop research, production and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes once more that promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the realization of "the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty", as stipulated in its article IV, constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. The Group strongly calls upon all States parties to the Treaty to fully respect this inalienable right and underscores that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance of the right of States parties to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as their right to cooperate among themselves, in particular in the technological field, in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is of the firm belief that the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of article IV of the Treaty plays a crucial role in achieving the object and purpose of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group also firmly believes that any measure aimed at hampering, fully or partly, the fullest exercise of these inalienable rights, would seriously jeopardize the delicate balance between rights and obligations of States parties in contravention of the Treaty's object and purpose and widens the gap between developed and developing countries in that field.

4. The Group recalls that the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also stipulates the right of member States to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes and to promote socioeconomic development by way of technical cooperation and the production of electric power, with due consideration for the

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needs of developing countries. To ensure the realization of these goals, all States parties, developed ones in particular, shall extend their assistance, as requested by States parties that are States members of IAEA, in the provision of nuclear equipment, material, technology and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the maximum benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities for peaceful purposes.

5. In this connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recognizes the major and important role of IAEA in assisting, in particular developing States parties to the Treaty, in planning for and the use of nuclear science and technology. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge-sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries for the sustaining and further enhancement of their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socioeconomic development. Moreover, the Group underlines that the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation, nuclear power and non-power applications contribute in an important way to meet energy needs, improve human health, including the application of nuclear technology in cancer therapy, combat poverty, protect the environment, develop agriculture, manage the use of water resources and optimize industrial processes, and that these activities, as well as bilateral and other multilateral cooperation, contribute to achieving the objectives set forth in article IV of the Treaty.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the IAEA technical cooperation programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with the IAEA statute and the agreed guiding principles as contained in INFCIRC/267, as well as the decisions of the IAEA policymaking organs. The Group reiterates that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the above objectives.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that IAEA and its then-Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize and reiterates the importance it attaches to the impartiality, professionalism and integrity of IAEA. While expressing its full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of IAEA, the Group strongly rejects any attempts by any State to politicize the work of IAEA, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of its statute, as well as any pressure on or interference in the Agency's activities that could jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of IAEA. In this connection, the Group also expresses its rejection of any attempts by any State party to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes, which is in violation of the statute of IAEA. The Group reaffirms that the choices and decisions of each State party to the Treaty in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

8. In this regard, while recognizing that a diverse portfolio of energy sources will be needed to allow access to sustainable energy and electricity resources in all regions of the world, and that States parties may pursue different ways to achieve their energy security and climate protection goals, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again acknowledges and reaffirms that each State party to the Treaty has the sovereign right to define its national energy policies, including fuel-cycle policies, in accordance with its national requirements and its rights and obligations under the Treaty.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including proposals for assurance of supply in response to the needs of interested States, shall fully take into account all technical, legal, political and economic complexities surrounding these issues, and be conducted through wide, integral, comprehensive and transparent multilateral consultations and negotiations. The multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle should be multilateral, economically viable, sustainable, non-discriminatory, predictable and transparent under the auspices of IAEA, as well as other possible regional and multilateral forums. The Group also stresses that any decision on proposals regarding multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus taking into account the interests of all member States, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its statute, without prejudice to the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty, if they so decide, to develop a full national fuel cycle, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines that "all the parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy" (art. IV, para. 2). In this regard, the Group stresses particularly the obligation of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of the developing countries to nuclear energy, by fully respecting this right with a view to achieving the widest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the contribution that uses of nuclear energy can make to progress in general and to helping overcome the technological and economic disparities between developed and developing States parties to the Treaty in particular. The Group firmly believes that as a fundamental principle, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment shall be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking particularly the needs of developing countries into account.

12. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its deep concern about the continued imposition and/or maintaining of limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In this regard, the Group stresses that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute. The Group therefore strongly calls for the immediate removal of any restrictions or limitations imposed on peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. In the view of the Group, transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty shall be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. The elimination of constraints inconsistent with the requirements of the Treaty would ensure that article IV of the Treaty is fully implemented with regard to the facilitation of transfer of nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes among the States parties.

13. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their "sensitivity", and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to the full scope of IAEA

safeguards. The Group firmly believes that fostering the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place, is one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. Moreover, the Group emphasizes that cooperation to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world is the core objective enshrined in the IAEA statute. Accordingly, the Group strongly encourages all States parties to actively cooperate, among themselves and through IAEA, in the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear energy, including through international technical cooperation.

14. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. The Group further emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development. Furthermore, such arrangements must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty.

15. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned about the ability of certain States that are not parties to the Treaty to obtain, in particular from some nuclear-weapon States, nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The Group strongly calls for the enforcement, without exception or further delay, of the total and complete prohibition, as stipulated in the Treaty, of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and of the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields, to States that are not parties to the Treaty.

16. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores that IAEA, under its statutory obligations, pursues the goals of technical cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear energy as one of the three pillars of its activities. In order to meet the objectives of peaceful purposes as enshrined in the statute of IAEA and in the Treaty, IAEA has to maintain the balance between technical cooperation and other activities. The Group believes that all States parties to the Treaty that are States members of IAEA have to ensure that the technical cooperation programme remains firm and sustainable through sufficient, assured and predictable financial and human resources. In this regard, the efficacy of the technical cooperation programme can best be ensured by the formulation of the programme and the strategies strictly in accordance with the needs and the requests of the developing countries.

17. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty affirms the need to strengthen the radiological safety and protection systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials as well as at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials. The Group reaffirms the need to strengthen existing international regulations relating to the safety and security of transportation of such materials. While reiterating the need to take necessary measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes, the Group calls for effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes on their territories.

18. The Group recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States. The Group reaffirms the central role of IAEA in nuclear-safety-related matters including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards. The Group stresses that IAEA must retain its centrality in this field, owing to its mandatory functions and long-standing expertise. The Group stresses that any possible review of nuclear safety standards at the global level must be carried out within IAEA in an inclusive, gradual and transparent manner and in consultation with and based on the guidance and participation of all member States, and shall incorporate the views of all member States. The Group also calls for the implementation of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety endorsed by the IAEA General Conference in September 2011.

19. The Group emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and nuclear security must not be used as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

20. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty. In the view of the Group, new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full scope of IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

21. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.

22. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, poses a great danger to human beings and the environment and constitutes a grave violation of international law, the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations of IAEA. In this regard, the Group recognizes the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument prohibiting attacks, or the threat of attacks, on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Moreover, the Group strongly calls upon all States, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, to refrain from attack or threat to attack nuclear facilities, operational or under construction, devoted to peaceful purposes.

23. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III, while providing for the undertaking by

each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be "in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes".

24. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. Since the Agency is the only organization which receives highly confidential and sensitive information on nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leakage of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime for their protection needs to be greatly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way, to any party not authorized by the Agency.

25. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty is determined to propose during the 2020 review process of the Treaty measures required to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties under the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination are fully protected.

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Safeguards

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expresses its strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions and, in this context, strongly underlines and affirms that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. In this regard, the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

2. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option. The Group further stresses that efforts aimed at nuclear non-proliferation must be parallel to simultaneous efforts aiming at nuclear disarmament.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that all States parties to the

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Treaty shall refrain from the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to States not party to the Treaty unless those conditions are met.

4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon all States not party to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

5. The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under this Treaty. In the view of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, such an agreement would be concluded with the aim to:

(a) Ensure full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

(b) Provide baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and prevent further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(c) Strictly observe the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, the object and the purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, materials and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

8. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations. In this regard, the Group also emphasizes that IAEA shall ensure avoiding any ultra vires acts that would jeopardize its integrity and credibility. The Group urges States parties to the Treaty to maintain and strengthen the technical character of IAEA consistent with its statute.

9. With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the need to strictly observe the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidents of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and its relevant regime pertaining to the protection of confidential information needs to be further strengthened. Hence, in the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.

12. In this context, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the implementation of resolution GC(60)/RES/13 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its sixtieth session, in which the General Conference, "stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements", acknowledged the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the Secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information, accordingly urged the Director General "to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information" and requested that he "continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information".

13. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the necessity that the reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards be factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.

14. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency's inspectors.

15. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.

16. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be "in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing".

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Verification

Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards "for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

2. In that regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards

> shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.

3. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science- and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.

4. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.

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5. In that connection, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency's statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(60)/RES/13, paragraph 38, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.

6. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that all States members of IAEA shall strictly observe its statute and that nothing should be done to undermine its authority. Furthermore, the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency's activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.

7. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

8. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States' obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:

(a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;

(b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.

9. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

10. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear

materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency's capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

11. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that the nuclear-weapon States, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their nuclear arsenals, should undertake further efforts, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner, to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. Furthermore, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to dismantle or convert for peaceful uses facilities and related equipment for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

12. In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.

13. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls upon the 2020 Review Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of those commitments through the establishment of an international mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States.

14. The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the 2020 Review Conference to establish a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreements by the nuclear-weapon States.